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    Poverty, in this paper, consists of two elements: income poverty and human poverty. 
Income poverty is defined as the lack of necessities for material well-being, which can be 
measured by incidence of poverty. 2  Human poverty means the denial of choices and 
opportunities for a tolerable life in non- income aspects. 3  Human poverty includes many 
aspects, such as deprivation in years of life, health, knowledge and housing, the lack of 
participation and lack of personal security. Due to the limitations of data availability and 
measurement, the scope of this paper is limited to income poverty and some aspects of 
human poverty in China.  
    The paper is divided into the following three sections: the first one provides a general 
picture of poverty reduction, including three phases in both income poverty and human 
poverty reduction (rapid progress, temporary setback and resumed progress) and the 
uneven progress in rural-urban disparity, regional disparity and disadvantaged groups. 
The second section examines the impacts of economic growth, especially agricultural and 
rural industrial growth, on poverty reduction. The third section focuses on the roles of 
government in terms of commitment, policies and expenditures, which are directly 
responsible for the rapid progress and temporary setback of poverty reduction. The last 
section introduces a targeted intervention program that the Chinese government launched 
in order to restart a fast improvement in both income poverty and human poverty.  
 
1.  Overview of Poverty Reduction  1.1. Three phases  
    China has complied an impressive record in reducing human poverty over the last four 
and half decades. The most telling indicators of the improvement in the overall well-
being of the Chinese population are the increase in life expectancy, the decline of 
mortality and the drop in adult illiteracy. As Table 1 shows, between 1949 and 1995, 
China's life expectancy at birth increased from 35 to 69, almost doubling, and the infant 
mortality rate sharply decreased from 200 to 42 in 1995. In addition, the under-five 
mortality rate declined from 209 in 1960 to 47 in 1995. There have been steady 
improvements in terms of educational attainment. The adult illiteracy rate declined from 
80% in the early 1950s to the current rate of 19%.4  and the enrolment rate for primary 
school-aged children is currently 98.5%, with the enrolment rates of boy and girl children 
98.9% and 98.2% respectively. 5  
    However, vast income poverty continued to exist in rural areas between the mid-1950s 
and the late 1970s. In 1959-62, the great famine, following the Great Leap Forward, 
killed more than 30 million people, most of whom were peasants. In 1970s, many hungry 
peasants throughout the country went to cities to beg for food. A special investigation 
into rural poverty was carried out in 1978. 6  By that time, according to the World Bank's 
estimate, there were 260 million rural people living in income poverty, which meant that 
one-third of the rural population lived under the poverty line. 7  The astonishing reality of 
the rural poverty situation created a sense of crisis within the new leadership and finally 
became the logic of reform in 1978.  
    After 1978, the reduction can be grouped into three different periods. Between 1978 
and 1985, tremendous progress was made in the reduction of income poverty. The 
incidence of poverty rapidly declined in China as Table 2 indicates. All figures estimated 
by the World Bank in this table are based on the national poverty line, which can be 
translated into 60¢ a day per capita in 1985 PPP$.8  Accordingly, between 1978 and 
1985, total population living below the national poverty line declined from 260 million to 
97 million, and the incidence of poverty declined from 33% to 9.2%. During the same 
period, the number of rural poor decreased to 96 million while the urban poor population 
decreased to less than 1 million. The declining trend of poverty incidence, if measured by 
the international standard--$1 a day per capita in 1985 PPP$, is also very clear. It dropped 
from about 60% in 1978 to less than 40% in 1985 9  (see Note: "The debate about income 
poverty line, the numbers and percentages of the poor of China"). As for human poverty 
reduction, the main indicators such as infant mortality rate, under-five mortality rate and 
longevity in this period continued to improve in accordance with earlier trends, although 
the pace of improvement has slowed down. For example, infant mortality per 1,000 live 
births continued to decline from 52 in the late 1970s to 50 in the mid-1985. 10  
    Nevertheless, China's progress in poverty reduction was not sustained during the 
second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. There were signs that income poverty had 
increased in 1989 and 1990 as Table 2 shows. The rural poor increased to 103 million in 
1989 from 86 million in 1988, and the incidence of poverty rose to 12.3% from 10.4%. 
Urban poverty rose from 0.2% in 1988 to 0.4% in 1990. The reverse progress in income poverty reduction was matched by a slight increase in human poverty. The increase in 
adult illiteracy rate was an example. The adult illiteracy rate rose from 23.5% in 1982 to 
26.8% in 1987, 11  and it is reported that more than 2 million new adult illiterates were 
added each year during the late 1980s 12  Of the 3 million school-aged children who did 
not enrol in school, 83% were girls. 13  In addition, in the poor areas, access to basic 
preventive health services stagnated during the second half of the 1980s. A 1989 survey 
conducted by the Ministry of Public Health in 300 poor counties revealed that infant 
mortality averaged 68 per 1000 --almost 50% greater than the national average--and 
exceeded 100 per 1000 in 38 of these counties. More than 80% of infant deaths occurred 
at home or en route to medical facilities. 14  Female infant mortality has also been rising, 
from the 1988 nationwide fertility survey, suggested by the observation of the rising sex 
ratios for children born in the 1980s.  
    After 1992, progress in both income and human poverty reduction resumed, although 
not as rapidly as during the period of 1978-85. The number of poor people moving above 
the poverty line rose to 5 million a year, compared with only 2.5 million in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s. By mid 1996, the number of people below the poverty line (530 
yuan at current prices) had fallen to 65 million from 94 million in 1991. The infant 
morality rate, at 36.4 per 1,000 live births, declined by 7.7% between 1990 and 1995. 15  
During the same period, the number of malnourished children under age five declined 
from 21% to 16%.16  Adult illiteracy rates also improved, decreasing from 22% to 
19%.17  
    Throughout the whole process of poverty reduction, there were still apparent inequities 
between rural and urban populations, between rich coastal areas and poor interior areas, 
between men and women, and minority and majority.  
1.2. Rural-urban disparity  
    Both rural and urban areas enjoyed rapid economic growth between 1978 and 1985. As 
a result, income disparity between these two areas declined and the ratio of urban to rural 
income reduced from 2.4 to 1.7. After 1985, the ratio started to rise. In 1994, the income 
of urban residents was 2.6 times that of the peasants, which presents the widest gap after 
1978. If the various types of subsidies that urban residents enjoy are included, and if all 
kinds of extra responsibilities and burdens (such as expenses and fees for subsidizing the 
members of families of the People's Liberation Army and revolutionary martyrs, 
subsidizing for cadres and for planned childbirth etc.) are deducted from peasant income, 
the actual income gap could be expressed as a ratio of 4 to 1. 18  
    Still today between one-quarter to one-third of the rural population only have access to 
contaminated water supplies. The water supply for 77 million people has excessive 
fluoride levels, 100 million drink saline or alkaline water, 130 million use untreated 
surface water contaminated by domestic, industrial or agro-chemical wastes, and 43 
million live in water-scarce areas. 19  Proper sanitation, furthermore, is almost totally 
lacking in rural areas. The percentage of urban population without access to sanitation between 1990-96 was 26% while this figure was 93% in rural areas during the same 
period. 20  
    Most of the rural poor reside in areas of severe environmental degradation. For a long 
time, these poor residents had no alternative21  but to extract their meager livelihood on 
some of the nations' least productive but most ecologically fragile lands. On the one 
hand, they are the victims of environmental destruction; on the other, their extractive 
activities further diminish agricultural potential. Continued population growth has 
reduced the per capita natural resource base supporting agricultural production. Arable 
land per agricultural labour has fallen by nearly one half from 0.57 hectares in the 1950s 
to 0.29 hectares today. Farmers in the poorer hill and mountain lands, where irrigation is 
more difficult and modern inputs hard to find, have by contrast been forced to extend 
production to ever steeper and more fragile slopes.  
1.3. Regional disparity  
     In the early 1980s, China's regions all shared the rapid real economic growth. But 
since the mid-1980s, regional disparity has become wider than before 1980. One study 
indicates that the relative regional disparity coefficient declined from 32.8 to 28.7 
between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, but increased from 28.8 in 1985 to 33.6 in 
1992. 22  
    Since most of the rural poor reside in the remote and mountainous terrain of the central 
and western provinces, there are significant differences between these poor provinces and 
rich coastal provinces in both income poverty and human poverty. As Table 3 shown, out 
of 592 of poor counties, there are 515 in the central and western regions, accounting for 
87% of total number of poor counties in 1994. In 1989 income poverty--incidence of 
poverty was highest in the western provinces at 20.3 when compared to the coastal 
provinces--3.6% and the central provinces--11.2%. In the western region, provinces with 
the highest relative incidence of poverty are Gansu (34.2%), Qinghai (23.7%), Inner 
Mongolia (23.5%), Shaanxi (20.3%), Yunnan (19%) and Ningxia (18.9%). In the coastal 
provinces, the incidence of poverty in Guangdong and Fujian was only 0.9% and 1.8% 
respectively.  
    The poorest areas--the western provinces are also characterized by high human 
poverty. In 1990, this region had the highest percentage of people not expected to survive 
to age 40--(9.7%) while the percentage is lower in the east (8.8% in one costal province). 
Western provinces also had the highest adult illiteracy rate--22%; this figure in the 
coastal provinces was 13%. Sixty two percent of people in the west do not have access to 
safe water, while only 22% are lacking water supplies in the costal areas. The human 
poverty index in the western provinces in 1990 was 44 while it was 24 in the central 
provinces and only 18 in the coastal provinces.  
1.4. Ethnic disparity      In resource constrained remote and mountainous rural areas, most poor people are net 
consumers of grain and other subsistence foods since the land in these interior areas is of 
such low quality that it is not possible to achieve subsistence levels of crop production. 
They are negatively affected by price increases for the crop production and further 
disadvantaged by high dependency households ratios, ill health. Among them, minority 
people represent a highly disproportionate share.  
    Minority people, who comprise about 8% of total population and 56 ethnic 
nationalities, are largely concentrated in remote, mountainous areas in the north-west and 
south-west regions. According to the 1988 survey conducted by the State Statistics 
Bureau, the incidence of poverty in minority areas reached 21.3%, much higher than the 
national average of 13.9%;23  and of the 592 poor counties defined by the Central 
government, 259 were located in minority areas, accounting for 44%.24  The survey also 
reveals that in Yunnan, out of 73 poor counties, 51 were minority autonomous counties, 
accounting for 70% of total minority counties. The World Bank estimated that in 1985, of 
the total 11.4 million minority people, 9.4 million of them were living below 120 yuan 
per year, compared with only 8.4% of Han (majority people). 25  The schooling level is 
also very low among minorities. In some minority areas, at least 50% of the boys and 
nearly 100% of the girls do not attend school and will not achieve literacy. 26  
1.5. Gender disparity  
    Women benefitted proportionately less than men from rapid economic growth. A 
detailed survey in 1988 and 1989 showed some relevant evidence. 27  In rural China 
women represented about 32% of wage employment. On the average they earned about a 
fifth less than the male workers. In urban areas, women receive only 74% of retirement 
income and only 56% of the income from private enterprises compared to income 
received by men.  
    Some other evidence also shows that there is an increase in the relative deprivation of 
women from access to education and health services. In 1991-92, girls represented about 
70% of all primary school age children (between 7 and 11 years) who were not enrolled. 
At the same time the primary school completion rate was significantly lower for girls 
(89%) than for boys (94%);28  and females constitute a high proportion--often 70%--of 
the illiterate population of the poor areas. The inadequacy of health services in poor areas 
leaves poor women at great risk of debilitating reproductive health problems. In 300 
counties surveyed by the Ministry of Public Health, up to 60% of births in poor areas are 
unattended; and maternal mortality averaged 202 per 100,000 --a level more than twice 
the national average of 95 per 100,000 and more than 10 times that of Beijing and 
Shanghai. 29  
2.  Impacts of Economic Growth on Poverty Reduction 2.1. Agricultural 
growth  
    Participatory economic growth 30  played a key role in the sharp decline of poverty. In 
the period of 1980-1993, the annual growth of GNP per capita grew 8.2%, almost doubling the rate of 4.3% from the earlier period of 1952-1980, and GNP per capita 
rapidly increased from $280 in 1980 to $530 in 1994. 31  Except for the early 1950s and 
the period 1962-65, when the economy was recovering from war or famine, at no time in 
the history of the PRC has the economy grown as fast as in the 1980s and the first half of 
the 1990s. Although, the growth rate declined to 4% or 5% in 1989 and 1990 due to the 
efforts to deal with unacceptably high inflation and turmoil, the rates reaccelerated to 7% 
in 1991, to 14% in 1992, 14% in 1993, 11% in 1994, and 10% in 1995. 32  The 
calculations show that the number of poor people declined by one percent for every one 
percent increase in real GDP in its rapid progress in both economic growth and income 
poverty reduction between 1978-1984. 33  
    The rapid growth of agriculture, is a direct determinant of the tremendous two-thirds 
reduction in poverty between 1978 and 1984. In this period, the value of agricultural 
output grew at a rate of 7.4% annually, compared with the rate of 2.5% in the period of 
1952-78. The annual growth rates of the three most important crops--grain, cotton and 
oil-bearing seeds were 4.8%, 17.7% and 13.8% respectively. The growth rates of these 
three crops exceeded by a wide margin those achieved in the previous 26 years, 2.4%, 
1.0% and 0.8%, respectively. 34  As a result of fast agricultural growth, per capita 
income for the rural population almost tripled between 1978 and 1984.  
    The growth rate, however, of personal income in rural areas between 1986-93 declined 
to 2.45 annually. During this period, each percentage of increase in GDP had a small 
impact, causing only 0.05% decline, in poverty. 35  The rate of poverty reduction rose 
somewhat in rural areas, but income inequality increased despite the fact that the 
economy continued to grow rapidly. One of the reasons is that the growth in gross output 
value of agriculture at constant price slowed down after 1985 and remained low before 
picking up again in 1992. The annual growth rate of per capita production of grain and 
oilseeds declined from 2.8% and 14.5% respectively during 1978-84 -0.4% and -1.6% 
during 1985-89. Coupled with the decline in agricultural growth, farmer's real incomes 
ceased to increase in 1990, for the first time since the commencement of rural reform in 
1978. The terms of trade for agriculture which improved rapidly in the early years of 
reform, from 100 in 1978 to 177 in 1988, showed a significant decline to 152 in 1992.  
2.2. Rural Industrial Development  
    Like fast agricultural growth, rapid development of rural enterprises (TVEs--Township 
and Village Enterprises) also had a very positive impact on poverty reduction. TVEs 
enlarge rural population's participation in economic growth by generating millions of jobs 
and increasing incomes which have benefitted a majority of the rural popolation. In 1978, 
total industrial production of TVEs was 49.3 billion yuan which accounted for 11.6 
percent of the gross national industrial production. In 1992, this figure rose to 2036 
billion yuan, which accounted for 38.6 percent of the gross national industrial production. 
36  The rapid growth of rural industrialization led to the creation of millions of jobs. 
From 1978 to 1993, total employment of TVEs increased from 28.3 million, which 
accounted for 7 percent of total employment, to 123.5 million, which accounted for 20.5 
percent of total employment and 27.9 percent of total rural labor force.      But rural enterprises, which are an important source of employment in the rural 
economy as a whole, have developed very slowly in poor areas. In the early 1980s such 
employment actually decreased in poor areas as the commune system was dismantled. By 
1990 only 4% of the rural labor force in China's 120 poorest counties found employment 
in rural enterprises, in contrast to 21% finding such employment in rural industries. Not 
only are fewer employed, but rural enterprise wages and profits are lower in poor areas 
than in the rest of the country.  
    A agricultural growth and rural enterprise development were closely connected to 
participating growth and poverty reduction at the beginning of the reform period. Thus it 
is not surprising that the absence of meaningful levels of agricultural growth and rural 
enterprise development in the poor areas correlated with the fact participatory growth and 
poverty and poverty reduction could not be sustained after 1985.  
.  
2.3. Urban-rural migration  
    Migration from rural to urban areas, 37  which was strongly discouraged before 1978, 
has played a positive role in decreasing income poverty in rural areas. For example, many 
surplus rural labourers in the western provinces, under the help of active programs, found 
jobs in the more developed areas of their own provinces or in the coastal provinces. Many 
of them sent income remittances that allow relatives on the farms to improve their 
standard of living, or took their saving back home to set up small businesses, creating 
needed jobs in the villages. Sichuan is a leading province for rural labour mobility with 
about 6 million peasants working in other provinces and another 4 million within the 
province. Remittances from those outside Sichuan province amounted to an estimated 20 
billion yuan ($2.4 billion) in 1995, accounting for 7% of the province's GDP. About 
300,000 of peasants who have returned have started their own businesses, creating 
thousands of local jobs. 38  
    Although impact of the rural-urban migration has been an indisputable factor in 
reducing poverty in rural China, it is almost certain that urban poverty would increase if 
these migrants are included in the household surveys. The government has recently 
estimated that the number of urban poor is about 12 million people.39 Most of the urban 
poor are migrants, who are worse off than the urban residents. The 1995 survey indicates 
that these migrants in cities have a high turnover of employment, and suffer from the 
disadvantage of being excluded from public housing and access to health services and 
schooling for children at low cost that urban residents are entitled to. 40  
   
3.  The Role of Government: Commitment, Policies, and Expenditures  
    Pro-poor growth strategy that the Chinese government adopted between 1978 and 1985 
is directly associated with a rapid decline in poverty. Yet, reduced state commitment to 
the widespread and equitable provision of public services, macroeconomic policies that favors the development of the coastal areas and insufficient funds for poverty reduction 
account for the stagnation of poverty reduction and slow rate of success of development 
of public services.  
   
3.1. Commitment  
    The Chinese government held a strong commitment to poverty reduction throughout 
the reform period. It adopted a poverty alleviation strategy during the 7th Five Year Plan 
(1986-90) with a new emphasis on economic development programs in the poor areas. 
The Ministry of Civil Affairs provided disaster relief and income maintenance support, 
and coordinated the distribution of relief grain with the Ministry of Commerce's Grain 
Bureau. The State Education Commission and the Administrator of the Ministry of Public 
Health Administer established some special programs to improve the education and 
health status of the poor. The Agricultural Bank of China and several other banks offered 
subsidized loans for poor area development through a variety of funds administered by 
provincial bank branches and their country- wide networks. The Regional Office of the 
State Planning Commission administered a Food-For-Work Program which assists with 
the building of roads and river and transport, drinking water systems, irrigation works 
and other capital construction in poor areas. In addition, each of the central ministries and 
agencies had its own special poor area project and every province has its own specially-
funded programs.  
    Two key poverty reduction initiatives were introduced in the 8th Five Year Plan (1991-
95), which were as follows: (1) the extension and strengthening of assistance to the 
poorest of the poor residing in the worst physical environments and (2) the integration of 
production, education, health, family planning and transport programs into 
comprehensive local intervention packages.  
    Other evidence, however, shows a somewhat reduced state commitment towards 
improving the well-being of the poor, especially in the fields of basic education and 
health services. This happens when the central government transfers a part of the 
responsibility of education and public health to local governments, and the latter are more 
willing to invest in production projects which can solve the problem of local 
unemployment and gain profits instantly rather than invest in basic education and health 
care. The central government has partly retreated from intervention in the related public 
service domain where market failures have caused problems: some people who are not 
able to take advantage of the market-oriented change and without a strong social safety 
net have fallen into poverty.  
    The central government has partially retreated from primary education due to its 
financial difficulty although it continues to make commitments at all levels of education. 
In May 1983 a circular of the State Council and the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party announced that the goal of universal primary education could only be 
achieved by "walking on two legs". 41 That means that each community should devise its 
own plan to achieve the state mandated goal. In 1984 Guofa No. 174 explicitly delegated financial responsibility for rural education to the government at Xiang level 42 , and in 
subsequent provincial regulations it was stated that the state money would stop at the 
county level. The results have been higher costs and falling rates of completion in both 
urban and rural areas, as well as wider disparities between urban and rural educational 
opportunities and greater inequalities between villages of different income levels. 
Villages with strong collective economies or the ability to tax local enterprises charge 
parents the lowest fees. By contrast parents in areas with only average incomes and no 
profitable village enterprises find educational fees may take as much as 50 percent of 
their disposable cash incomes, and those living in the truly impoverished areas find the 
costs totally beyond what they can afford.  
    Similarly, there is evidence that the central government also retreated from the basic 
administrative and financial support of rural welfare and health care system. In March 
1985, the Ministry of Civil Affairs authorized each province to assume responsibility for 
welfare polices and programmes that had previously been administered by the central 
government. 43  Guofa No. 45 in June 1986 and Guofa No. 64 in August of the same 
year completed the transformation of rural relief. In addition, the government adapted the 
health reforms to open up rural access to a variety of health enterprises and allow various 
types of ownership of health facilities to flourish including private clinics and hospitals 
and private practitioners. Private practitioners were given legal status as early as 1980 
and by 1982 a pluralistic health care system was being established in rural areas. But the 
result of the reform is not very satisfactory to the rural population--the privatization may 
have been successful in the developed areas but has failed in the poorest areas. Poor area 
village studies show that cost of medical care, especially hospitalization and drugs, 
hamper the poor's access to curative health care. Another study reveals that about half of 
the rural poor are reduced to poverty by disease. 44  
    The Chinese government admitted that the health reforms and collapse of the 
communes led to a decline in the health standards and health work in rural areas. State 
Council Document No, 4 of 1991 stated in its foreword: "During health reform we 
ignored the support of rural health work. Investment for health care was reduced; the 
lower levels of the health care system in the towns and villages were severely hit. The 
CMS (Cooperative Medical Services) disappeared. Medical prices increased without 
regulation and we could not control private doctors. Rural residents could not afford 
medical care and diseases which had disappeared appeared again and the gap between the 
rural and urban areas increased." 45  In July 1996, in a remarkably candid statement 
made at a national conference, the Minister of Health, Chen Minzhang, identified the 
individual burden of health service cost for the rural poor as the cause of increased 
poverty. He said, "We can no longer let farmers be responsible for dealing with serious 
diseases themselves; their incomes are too low." 46  
   
3.2. Policies  
    At the beginning of reform, the Chinese government took several measures to attack 
poverty, such as expanding marketing networks, freeing up prices and encouraging diversification and commercialization of agriculture. These measures significantly 
contribute to the strong agricultural growth during the period between 1978 and 1984.  
    There were four specific policy reforms that significantly enhanced the effects of 
participatory agricultural growth on poverty reduction. The first one was land reform, 
coupled with widespread decollectivization. Empirical studies show that the total factor 
productivity in the collective system was about 20% to 30% lower than in the household 
system. 47  Through the land reform and decollectivization, collective land in most areas 
was equally distributed to a household in proportion to the size of the household, which 
substantially stimulated the incentives of peasants to increase agricultural output. A 
careful econometric analysis found that of the remarkable 42.2% output growth in the 
cropping sector in 1978-84, about 54% was attributable to productivity growth due to 
reforms. Of the productivity growth, 97% was attributable to the change in farming 
institutions from collectivization to the household responsibility system. 48  
    The second was market-oriented reform. The government cut the grain procurement 
quota and reduced the number of products covered by plan control to increase grain 
production. For example, the number of planned product categories were reduced from 
21 in 1978 to 13 in 1982. 49  Special measures were also taken to loosen restrictions on 
inter-regional trade in agricultural products by private traders, and to encourage areas that 
traditionally had a comparative advantage in cotton production to expand cotton-sown 
acreage.  
    The third was price reform. The government adjusted procurement prices for major 
crops, which directly contributed to the increase of income in rural China. Announced at 
the end of 1978 and effective from 1979, prices for quota increased 20.9% for grain, 
23.9% for oil crops, 17% for cotton, 21.9% for sugar crops and 24.3% for pork. The 
government, on average increased procurement prices by 22.1% for major crops, and 
retail prices by 33% for pork, eggs and fish and others. This state procurement price 
increase was estimated to contribute about 16% to output growth, and 20% to the 
increase in rural per capita income in 1978-84. 50  
    The fourth was migration policy. The government eased controls and allowed millions 
of rural residents to move temporarily or permanently to towns or cities in 1982. In 1983 
temporary migration from villages to townships while retaining village household 
registration was allowed. In 1984, permanent migration from villages to urban areas was 
approved. These measures help reduce urban-rural disparity, regional disparity, and 
increased the standard of living in rural areas.  
    However, a shift in China's development strategy affected the progress in poverty 
reduction. Until the middle of the 1980s China was following an agriculture-led strategy 
of development. Since the mid-1980s, its development strategy has distinctly been 
oriented towards export-led industrialization. The focus of public investment and fiscal 
incentives was deliberately shifted in favor of the coastal growth poles by providing 
special privileges, incentives, and investment allocation to coastal provinces and cities, 
including the permission of greater retention of local tax and foreign exchange revenues and greater freedom to use expansionary bank loans for local investment. It left more 
isolated provinces and counties in the interior provinces with fewer resources and the 
same authoritative state pricing and procurement procedures. This also caused a widening 
regional disparity after the mid-1980s.  
3.3. Expenditures  
    Government budgetary expenditure is a main tool for affecting poverty reduction. 
Table 4 provides details of the expenditure structure of government. As the table shows, 
the share of total government expenditures in GDP has sharply declined, from 31 percent 
of GDP in 1978 to 13 percent in 1994. Government expenditures on culture, education, 
science and health care also decreased from 3.8% at the beginning of the 1980s to 2.8% 
in 1994. This indicates that the fiscal capability of the government to mobilize resource 
has been weakened during the reform era.  
    With limited resources, the government tried to address the most serious problem of 
poverty reduction. At the beginning of the 1980s, the government recognized that certain 
groups were not likely to share in the increased income growth. Studies of mountainous 
regions in South China such as Guangxi and Guizhou provinces, carried out by the State 
Council Research Center for Rural Development (RCRD) in 1983-84 provided strong 
evidence that the rural reform program alone would not be sufficient to overcome 
continued low productivity in poorly endowed areas. This suggests that it is necessary for 
the government to provide targeted assistance funds to poor areas.  
    On the recommendation of the RCRD, the State Planning Commission in 1984 set up a 
Food-For-Work Program designed to use surplus grain and cotton stocks to pay for 
infrastructure construction in financially depressed areas. The purpose of this program 
reflects a fundamental change in poverty alleviation methods from focusing on pure relief 
to emphasizing the development of the capacity to produce income in poor areas. In the 
initial stage, the fund for the Food-For-Work Program provided by the central 
government was less than 700 million ($250 million) 51 yuan a year. The current annual 
amount of the fund allocated by the central government is 4 billion yuan (around $470 
million) 52 . By the end of 1995, the total value of the funding, grain and other 
commodities allocated by the central government reached 28.6 billion yuan ($3.4 billion) 
53 , and the input by local government totaled around 25 billion yuan ($3 billion). 54  
    However, government expenditure on agriculture declined. This decline affected the 
further growth of agriculture, which in turn, affected the continuing progress of poverty 
reduction. Government expenditure on agriculture as proportion of total expenditure fell 
from 13.6% in 1978 to 8.3% in 1985 and stayed there in 1993. Furthermore, total 
government expenditure on rural relief and poverty alleviation programs declined as a 
share of total expenditure during the second half of the 1980s. For instance, The 
expenditures on social welfare, relief and other funds declined from 1.9% to 1.5% (see 
Table 4).      Although the Chinese government increased expenditure on health and education as a 
share of both total expenditure during the reform period, most of the real increase in 
government expenditure on health and education has benefited the well-off urban 
population and middle and upper income rural inhabitants, and very little of the increase 
has reached the absolute poor during the period of the 1980s. Government expenditure on 
education, health, relief and other social services in the poor areas, in the form of grants, 
subsidized credit and other programs, is estimated to have totaled under Y10 billion in 
1990. By contrast, the expenditure on urban consumer food subsidies increased sharply 
throughout the reform period, reaching Y50 billion in 1990.  
   
4.  The 8-7 Poverty Eradication Programma  
    The reduced pace of poverty reduction starting in the mid-eighties caught the attention 
of the Chinese government. The government's response was to launch a targeted 
intervention programme in 1994. 55  In this programme, the government has taken 
several critical measures to attack poverty, like setting goals, strengthening state 
institutions, providing additional funds and effectively utilizing these funds, and 
mobilizing resources.  
4.1. Setting the goals  
    In the programme, the Chinese government made a very strong commitment to poverty 
reduction. It announced that the aim of the program was to "have basically eliminated 
absolute poverty throughout China by the year 2000." This is widely known as the 8-7 
Poverty Reduction Programma. The 8 (for 80 million people) 7 (for the 7 years to the 
year 2000) program set a goal to lift the 80-100 million remaining poor out of poverty by 
the year 2000.  
    The government also committed itself to education for all. In a Beijing news 
conference on March 14, 1995, State Education Commission Minister Zhu Kaoxuan said 
that 98 percent of the school-age children in China are at school, with a subsequent drop-
out rate of just 2 percent, but the average drop-out rate in the countryside stands at 3 
percent. According to his announcement, by the year 2000, China will reach its twin 
target of extending nine-year compulsory education to 85 percent of the population and 
eliminating illiteracy among citizens aged 15-45 in the areas where 90 percent of the 
national population lives. The goal is to bring illiteracy down to below 5 percent on 
average. 56  In addition, the government committed to health-for-all. It planned to 
reestablish cooperative health insurance schemes--trying to raise the level of coverage 
from the current 10%.57  to 70% by the year 2000 and 80% by 2010.  
    In order to achieve the goals, the government has resumed supportive public 
intervention in the fields of basic education and health care and built an essential base for 
the expansion of social opportunities by giving privileges to poor areas through 
preferential financial and monetary policies, and by increasing investment and loans. It 
has extended and strengthened assistance to the poorest of the poor residing in the worst physical environments, and tailored to the special needs of minorities, communities 
residing in remote and often high altitude areas, and other disadvantaged groups. The 
government emphasizes the need to expand income-earning opportunities among 
disadvantaged groups by strengthening crop, forestry, and livestock production, 
developing transport and communications services, promoting mineral and mining 
development, improving special products and raising the levels of scientific knowledge, 
education, literacy, health, and physical fitness in minority areas.  
4.2. Strengthening the state institutions  
    In the 8-7 Programme, leaders of the central government in charge of poverty 
alleviation called on all parties, the central government and local governments, mass 
organizations and enterprises directly under the central government to participate in 
poverty reduction work. It reconfirms and extends the role of the Leading Group for the 
Economic Development of Poor Areas (LGEDPA) as the coordinating body responsible 
for poverty measurement and research, project planning and monitoring and management 
of both domestic and international funding for poverty reduction.  
    LGEDPA has been played a very important role in poverty reduction since it was 
estalished in 1986, authorized by the State council as the leading anti-poverty institution 
to coordinate anti-poverty program at ministerial levels. Via LGEDPA, the anti-poverty 
executive agency, the Poor Area Development Office (PADO) reports to the state 
Council. In addition to LGEDPA and PADO, the State Council also funds four other anti-
poverty units which operate within the Leading Group orbit: the China Development 
Foundation for Poor Areas, the Cadre Training centre, the Training Centre Office, and the 
Economic Development Service Centre. Provinces, prefectures and counties have all 
established Leading Groups and PADOS after the central model, and many townships 
have a "designated person" to handle anti-poverty work.  
    Many other state institutions play an active role in poverty alleviation in China. 
According to the 1994 statistics, the number of Central Party agencies, Central 
Government agencies and enterprises and institutions directly under the central 
government who participate in the partnership effort increased from 81 in 1993 to 120 in 
1994, and poor countries receiving their support totaled 329, accounting for 56% of the 
total 592 poor counties. At the same time, 2457 provincial party agencies, provincial state 
agencies and enterprises, institutions and mass organizations directly under provincial 
government also conducted similar activities in 660 poor countries defined by the central 
government and provincial governments. 58  
    The Women's Federation is a good example of an organisation working on poverty 
alleviation. Since adopting poverty alleviation as a principal area of emphasis in 1986, 
the Women's Federation has become the lead advocate of poor women. It, through its 
offices at all levels of the Women's Federation down to the administrative village, has 
special responsibility for poverty alleviation activities. These activities include: (1) 
organising training courses in applied planting techniques and pest prevention for grain 
and case crops, animal husbandry, forestry and other production skills (the Women's Federation helps to organise 405,000 such training courses in 1990, in collaboration with 
Ministry of Agriculture); (2) establishing a number of case crop production bases which 
train and employ poor women in the production of fruits, coffee and tea, sugar cane, 
aquatic products and others; (3) augmenting the provision of credit and farm inputs to 
poor women through the Agricultural Bank of China; and (4) facilitating female labor 
mobility from poor villages to employment opportunities in nearby town, counties and 
provinces.  
4.3. Providing additional funds and effectively utilizing these funds  
    The Chinese government combines political commitment with financial commitment 
to poverty reduction in order to meet the goal of the 8-7 program. The central government 
decided to increase annual contribution for poverty alleviation. From 1996 on, it will 
invest an additional input of 4.5 billion yuan annually. This will make annual funding 
poverty alleviation totals 15.3 billion yuan. 59  
    Utilising funds effectively for the poverty reduction is very important for reaching the 
stated goals. Mistargeted funds not reach individual poor households. Misallocation 
happens in the following two ways: First, the central government and provincial 
government distribute the funds to poor counties according to the needs of the area, but 
county governments distribute it according to whether people are able to repay. Most 
poverty alleviation funds are issued as loans with subsidized interest rate, but extremely 
poor people have no economic capacity to repay the loan, and thus can hardly get access 
to the loans. Second, targeting funds have not been well-distributed. According to a 
survey made in 1994, 30% of the funding for poverty alleviation and the food for work 
funding from the central government that should have been issued to the 592 poor 
counties were distributed in other places. Forty percent of the development fund, that 
should have been used to support undeveloped areas was misallocated. Only 70% of the 
funds for poverty alleviation and the food for work programme and 60% of the funding to 
support unadvanced areas reached the poor counties in 1994. 60  
    In order to effectively utilize the funds for poverty reduction, the central government 
has restricted the expenditure for local government consumption. The central government 
suggests that in poor countries, there should be no hotels, government office buildings, 
cellular telephones or cars before the poverty problems are solved. 61  
   
4.4. Mobilizing Resources  
    In addition to increasing funds, the central government also mobilizes the financial 
resources from developed provinces and municipalities in the coastal areas to support the 
target provinces and autonomous regions in poor areas by employing a partnership 
method, one of major measures instituted in the 8-7 programme. The partnership are 
arranged as follows: Beijing helps Inner Mongolia, Tianjin helps Gansu, Shanghai helps 
Yunan, Guangdong helps Guangxi, Jiangsu helps Shaanxi, Zhejiang helps Sichuan, 
Shandong helps Xinjiang, Liaoning helps Qinghai, Fujian helps Ningxia, Shenzhen, Qingdao, Dalian and Ningbo help Guizhou. For example the Mayor of Shenzhen already 
allocated 17 million ($2 million) Chinese yuan for social welfare and infrastructure plus 
200 million ($24 million) yuan to support a variety of development projects in Guizhou 
province in the southwest. 62  
    Resources for poverty reduction are mobilized from other social institutions as well. In 
order to raise money to build primary and secondary schools, and aid children in China's 
poor rural areas who are unable to attend school or are forced to suspend their studies 
because of poverty, a number of programs have been set up. Xiwang (Hope) Program, 
launched by the Youth League and the Chunlei (Spring Bud) Programme by the All-
China Federation of Women and the Children's Foundation of China, are quite 
successful. Encouraging progress has been made in the Xiwang Program, which have 
received 253 million yuan from domestic and overseas donations as of March 1996; and 
these money helped 237,000 pupils return to schools, and established 1,325 elementrary 
schools. 63  Chunlei program was established in 1992 to collect funds from private 
entrepreneurs, NGOs, and private individuals throughout China and abroad to help girls 
who were unable to carry on their education due to poverty to return to school. Between 
1992-93, Chunlei girls' classes were expanded from 14 in four provinces and regions to 
1166 in 23 provinces and regions.  
    In addition, local communities play an increasing role in mobilizing resources for 
poverty reduction. In developed rural areas such as Guangdong Province and Jiangsu 
Province, the villages and townships build community financial funds by using the profits 
of local enterprises. The funds are used to support local school for adults as well as the 
elderly and the disabled, and to establish a system of insurance which enables peasants to 
recover part of their expenses in case of illness.  
    In addition to income poverty, some evidence shows that there has been less success in 
the development of public services, particularly in the poorer rural areas.  
    The Chinese government adopted policies to expands marketing networks, free up 
prices, and encourage the diversification and commercialisation of agriculture, all of 
which help account for the strong agricutlural growth of 1978-1985. However, at this 
time, the government recognised that general economic growth was a necessary but 
insufficient condition to overcoming poverty in some areas of the country, and that in 
order to achieve growth with equity, specific anti-poverty measures must be incorporated 
into regional economic planning. The new, explicit poverty reduction approach 
emphasised the development of income-generating activities based on local resources and 
local organisations, as the key to sustainable poverty reduction: Continued provision of 
direct relief aid and social services, and establishing preferential taxing, pricing and other 
measures to stimulate poor area development, and targeting assistance funds to poor 
areas.  
    The setback in poverty reduction since the mid-1980s was particularly associated with 
a sharp reduction in the rate of growth in rural income and a continued increase in the 
inequality of income distribution.  •  The association between growth and poverty reduction is more obvious in China's 
case than India's. The much higher growth rate of the Chinese economy should be 
credited for this difference. In the period of 1978-1990, China did not take 
substantial redistributive efforts but it is participatory growth rather than radical 
redistribution that accounts for the rapid decline of poverty. 
•  Bad growth performance results in bad poverty reduction performance. In India, 
in 1963-76, income performance stagnated and the poverty performance was bad. 
(In 1976-89, both improved substantially). On the other hand when the index of 
agricultural production for all commodities fell by 2.5% between 1990-91 and 
1991-92, rural poverty went up. In contrast, As in India, the accelerated decline in 
poverty in the period from the mid-1970s to 1989 was coupled with a higher-than-
normal growth rate of GDP per capita during the same period. 
•  Good growth performance does not always bring good poverty reduction 
performance. 
•  In China's case, a thriving market economy has helped to lift all Chinese people 
out of poverty. China makes excellent use of the market system in a poor 
economy without losing the commitment to economic development and the 
elimination of mass deprivation. The market mechanism has been used in China 
to create additional access to economic assets and opportunities. The demise of 
the commune institution has decreased poverty by enlarging private sector 
participation in the production of goods and services. 
    In addition, China has successfully transformed its economy from a closed to an open 
economy. Its foreign trade currently ranks the 11th in the world economy. The degree of 
openness of the economy, which is calculated by trade against GDP, is strikingly rising 
from 11% in 1978, 18% in 1985, 25% in 1990, 33% in 1992, to 40% in 1995. 64  While 
accomplishing this trade growth, China has also recently accumulated $90 billion in 
foreign exchange reserves, ranking 2nd place in the world after Japan. In addition, China 
has attracted tens of billions of dollars of foreign direct investment, ranking the 2nd place 
only to USA in recent years.  
    The government has adopted an erosion control strategy in land rehabilitation project 
watersheds since the 1950s. It included the construction of wide terraces on hillsides, soil 
dams in gullies, and large-scale afforestation. The pace of erosion control was accelerated 
in the 1970s but implementation of these measures was insufficient to offset growing 
population pressure. Beginning in the late-1970s, the government responded to the 
limited effectiveness of the previous erosion control measures with intensive research and 
development programmes to simultaneously improve erosion control and agricultural 
production. More than 300 research agencies and stations are now developing and testing 
a number of soil erosion control measures and improved agricultural production 
techniques. The package of erosion control measures are as follows: (1) construction of 
narrow terraces by cutting currently cultivated hillsides with slopes of up to 25%; (2) 
establishment of pasture plants by planting seed on unterraced hillsides with slopes of 
25% to 35%; (3) construction of soil dams and dam land, including large soil dams near 
the outlet of each watershed and numerous small soil dams situated along many of the 
small feeder gullies; and (4) improvement of agricultural technologies, including better chemical and organic fertilizer strategies, testing and introduction of improved varieties, 
and new cultural practices for improving water use efficiency.  
    More isolated and poorer regions grew markedly slower than coastal areas. Economic 
growth per capita in these poor areas during 1978-89 was 30% less than that of the 
coastal provinces. The slower growth rate of the coastal areas in the northeastern, 
northwestern, and southwestern provinces during the 1980s are consistent with the slower 
than average growth of rural per capita income in these same provinces.  
    (The regional differences in per capita GDP is increasing as well. Compared to 1992, 
per capita GDP of the coastal provinces increased 41% in 1993, 10% above the central 
provinces and 16% above the western provinces. )  
    Infant and maternal mortality rates in very poor counties are 50% to 100% greater than 
the national average. Incidence of several infectious and endemic diseases, including 
tuberculosis and iodine deficiency disorders, are concentrated in these poor and remote 
areas. Roughly 50% of children in households at or below the absolute poverty line are at 
least mildly malnourished, and about 90% of poor children suffer chronic helminthic 
infection.  
Population growth has also exacerbated pressure on pasture land and forest areas. The 
pasture lands of northwestern China have been increasingly overgrazed, resulting in 
serous pasture degradation. In southwestern China, siltation and flooding of major rivers 
have increased. Insecurity of forest tenure, which encourages peasants to immediately 
extract whatever forest products they control and to minimize their investment in forest 
land. The rapidly growing demand for wood in industry and construction and as fuel in 
rural areas also augment forest and watershed destruction.  
    The programme continues to stress the importance of the "self-help" approach taken 
during the previous planning period: namely, the creation of new income-earning 
opportunities in poor areas based on best use of indigenous natural and human resources. 
Since most of the poor are farmers, the anti-poverty agenda outlined in the program 
focuses on agriculture growth, particularly to initiate new commercial ventures in 
livestock, forestry, fruit trees and plantation crops: to improve input supply, marketing, 
and technical advisory services to help poor farmers to expand productivity, to develop 
rural infrastructure (roads, power, water supply), to generate off-farm employment 
opportunities to absorb surplus labor, and to improve education, health and family 
planning services in the poor areas.  
4.5. Gaining international cooperation  
    China has obtained a great deal of international assistance for long-term development 
programmes. Most of them are aimed at supporting broad-based economic growth and 
some of them are explicitly directed at poverty concerns. The IFAD and WFP 
programmes are some examples. Since 1984, IFAD has provided US$136 million in 
support to six projects specifically targeted at poor households. Overall objectives are to 
increase employment opportunities and incomes of low income households, increase food production and improve nutritional and general living standards. Similarly, WFP targets 
its assistance specifically at the lowest-income rural households in resource-poor counties 
of the some southwest and northwest provinces, such as Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Shannxi, 
Guizhou, Yunnan and Guangxi. Between 1985 and 1990, WFP approved 50 development 
projects and two emergency operations totaling US$585 million.  
    UNDP, with resources of $189 million over the period 1991-95, targets poverty 
alleviation. It mainly works an research and training, in conjunctions with other 
institutions and the municipal governments, in poor and remote areas in Northwest China, 
aiming to improve agricultural productivity--desertification control, rain farming, 
mechanization, education and diversification. UNDP has also established the UN 
Interagency Working Groups on Poverty Alleviation in China to discuss current issues, 
exchange information and consider the possibility of collaboration on joint projects.  
    UNICEF established a cooperative programma with China through the government's 
National Programme of Action (NPA), targeted at disadvantage areas. The programme 
concentrates UNICEF's resources on improving education and reducing mortality and 
malnutrition. The maternal and child health and family planning project, for example, is 
targeted at 300 counties with high infant mortality rates, high birth rates and low per 
capita income levels. The project, which is funded in part by UNFPA and technically 
supported by WHO, supports training and development of services at the township and 
village levels and strengthens leadership capacity at the county level. With the objective 
of improving the well-being of children and women, 20 such counties have received 
support in at least three of the following areas: health, education, water and sanitation, 
income generation opportunities, and vocational and literacy training for women.  
    The World Bank helps to focus on especially poor areas in China's northern, 
northwestern and south-western areas. It provide a high level of funds to aid China's 
poverty reduction by demonstrating the effectiveness of multi sectoral rural development, 
enhancing rural mobility, using labor-intensive public-works to build rural infrastructure, 
increasing upland agricultural productivity, and developing town and village enterprises.  
   
Conclusion  
   
    China achieved tremendous progress in the reduction of both income and human 
poverty between 1978 and 1985. Its fast growing agriculture and rural industries, and the 
pro-poor strategy of the government played a determining role. However, the progress 
has slowed down and stagnated in the period of 1986-92. The reduced commitment of the 
central government towards widespread public services, the shift to development 
strategies in favor of the coastal areas without enough compensation for poor western 
areas, combined with insufficient funds contributed to the stagnation of poverty 
reduction. After 1993, especially in 1994, when the comprehensive anti-poverty program 
was formally established, the Chinese government's renewed commitment to poverty 
reduction started to show some results. By the beginning of 1997, the proportion of the 
population living below the national poverty line fell to 58 million. 65  There is still a long way to go, however if China is to achieve its goal of irradicating income poverty by 
the year 2000. The pace must pick up.  
China's experiences in poverty reduction tells the following lessons:  
•  Good growth performance does not always bring good poverty performance. 
•  Bad agricultural growth performance brings bad poverty performance. 
•  Without timely public intervention, the close relationship between the 
participatory growth and rapid poverty reduction cannot be sustained. 
•  Political commitment to poverty reduction must be combined with financial 
commitment at all times. 
•  The government should always endorse education-for-all and health-for-all 
policies. 
Note: The debate about income poverty line, the numbers and percentages of the 
poor of China  
    The incidence of poverty depends on the choice of poverty line. The World Bank 
report in 1992-- China: Strategies for Reducing Poverty in the 1990s (hereafter called 
Strategies) suggests that fewer than 100 million Chinese lived in poverty in 1993, 
declining from 270 million in 1978. A new World Bank study--Poverty Reduction and 
the World Bank: Progress and Challenges in the 1990s (hereafter called Poverty Report) 
reports that 350 million people were poor in 1993. These two studies used different ways 
to measure the poverty line. The first one illustrates how many Chinese are poor by 
Chinese standards of welfare and entitlement, which reflects national norms, priorities 
and constraints, and serves to identify the potential beneficiaries of national poverty 
alleviation efforts. The second one measured the number poor Chinese by international 
standards of poverty, used for cross-country comparisons of poverty levels.  
    The international standard used by the World Bank takes $1 a person a day as the 
poverty threshold while the national poverty line used in the Strategy translates into 
roughly 60c a person a day. Both studies rely on the same basic source of data--
household surveys conducted by the Chinese State Statistical Bureau--but use different 
measurements of the standard of living, suggesting different results. The number of 
Chinese poor measured by international standards is more than triple of the mumber 
measured by the national standard. One of the reasons for this difference is that average 
income measured by the PPP method is now lower than previously thought. The most 
authoritative estimates (Summers and Heston, the Penn World Table--PWT 5.0) had 
previously placed China's PPP GDP per capita in the early 1990s close to US$3,000, but 
now the new table (PWT 5.6) shows it to be $1,800. 66  
    For the $1 a day per capita formula, while the World Bank asserts that the new 
adjustment of the number of the Chinese poor "constitutes a significant improvement 
over earlier estimates..." the Chinese government shows its considerable frustration and 
dissatisfaction. It argues that with the application of this formula, many relatively well-
off areas in China would have to be reclassified as poor. The government also argued that 
China is moving in the right direction in alleviating poverty while the new Bank estimates could suggest to the casual readers of the international media that the Chinese 
government was trying to mislead people about the real situation, which, they claimed, is 
not true. It questioned whether the Bank estimates were being prepared by a bunch of 
"academics with computers" without understanding of the realities of conditions in rural 
China.  
    The national poverty line that the Chinese government has adopted is different from 
that of the World Bank in Strategies. China has used the following five criteria in 
different period to define the rural poor: (1) between 1978 and 1985, rural people who 
lived below 120-150 yuan were poor; (2) between 1986 and 1992, rural people who lived 
below 200 yuan were poor; (3) in 1993, the poverty line was 300 yuan; (4) in 1994, the 
poverty line was 450 yuan; and (5) in 1995, the poverty line was 530 yuan. 67  The 
poverty lines used in the fourth and fifth periods are more scientific than the other three. 
68  These two were designed by including both a food poverty line and a non-food 
poverty line based on the survey conducted by the State Statistics Bureau concerning 
farmers' livelihood and changing price.  
    Eventually, within the Chinese government, several agencies have produced different 
estimates of poverty incidence based on different poverty lines in rural China. These 
agencies include RCRD, PADP, MOA (the Ministry of Agriculture), 69  CHIP (The 
China Household Income Project, which sponsored the survey in 1989 which was carried 
out by a Sino-US team of social scientists), and the SSB (the State Statistical Bureau). 70  
Yet China still lacks an accurate and uniform estimate of the number its people living 
below the national poverty line.  
    Since the World Bank and the Chinese government use different national poverty lines 
to measure the number of rural poor, the numbers that the Chinese government provides 
differ from the estimates of the World Bank. In Strategies, the World Bank used the 
national poverty line to measure poverty incidence. In it, it was reported that "World 
Bank estimates show the number of absolute poor to have declined from roughly 270 
million in 1978 to 97 million in 1985, or from about one-third to less than one-tenth of 
the total population." 71  In Poverty Report, the World Bank made the same statement 
about the China's poor that "Between 1978 and 1985, the number of poor declined from 
270 million to less than 100 million, according to the national poverty threshold of 
US$0.60 per day." 72  However, the Chinese government "uses a more stringent 
definition of absolute poverty for the purposes of targeting its social expenditures," 73  
and claims that in the same period, the poor population dropped from 250 million to 125 
million, averaging an annual reduction of 17.86 million poor, and a decrease in rural 
poverty to 14.8% in 1985 from 30.7% in 1978.  
    The other debate comes from the evaluation of the second period of poverty reduction 
since reform. The World Bank argues that the China's progress was not sustained during 
the second half of the 1980s, and that there even were signs that poverty increased in 
1989 and 1990. The rural poor population increased to 103 million in 1989 from 86 
million 1988, and incidence of poverty to 12.3% from 10.4%. Riskin finds that the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line reached a trough of 12.3% in 1985, then rose to 14.8% in 1988, based on State Statistical Bureau data. 74  UNDP also notes 
that poverty alleviation efforts decline between 1986 and 1994. 75  
    In contrast, using updated information on poverty reduction, the Chinese government 
sees the period of 1986-93 as the period of steady reduction of poor population, in which, 
the poor population was reduced from 125 million to 80 million, and the incidence of 
poverty dropped from 14.8% to 8.8%. Another Chinese study, "Regional Poverty 
Alleviation Programme: Study Report of Poverty Alleviation in China" shows the same 
figures but slightly different years for the period.  
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Table I: Progress in Poverty Reduction (I) 
   
 
Life expectancy at 
birth   
(in years) 
Infant 
mortality rate  
(per 1000 live 
Adult illiteracy rate   










34.7 a  ..  ..  200 a  80 b ..  .. 
1950-
1955 
40.8 42.3 39.3 195..  ..  .. 
1955-
1960 
44.6 46.2 43.1 179..  ..  .. 
1960-
1965 
49.5 50.4 48.7 121..  ..  .. 
1965-
1970 
59.6 60.4 58.8 81..  ..  .. 
1970-
1975 
63.2 63.9 62.5 61..  ..  .. 
1975-
1980 
65.3 66.3 64.5 52 34.0 21.4 47.3 
1980-
1985 
66.6 67.7 65.5 52 27.5 16.6 39.1 
1985-
1990 
67.1 68.4 65.8 50 22.2 13.0 31.9 
1990-
1995 
68.5 70.5 66.7 44 18.5 10.1 27.3 
1995-
2000 
69.9 71.7 68.2 38 15.0 7.7 22.6 
   
Source: Life expectancy and infant mortality rate are from Demographic Indicators 1950-2050 
(The 1994 Revision), by United Nations Population Division, 1994. Adult illiteracy rate is from 
UNESCO 1996.  
Note: a. WHO, "Evaluation of the Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000: Seventh Report on 
the World Health Situation, Vol. Western Pacific Region, 1986, p. 56.  
b.  "Updated government information on poverty alleviation and development in China." 
   
 
Table I: Progress in Poverty Reduction (I) 
   
   Daily calorie supply per capita  GNP per capita 
1969-71 1,999 .. 
1974-76 2,086 .. 
1980 2,337 270 
1981 .. 290 
1982 .. 290 
1983 .. 300 1984 .. 340 
1985 .. 380 
1986 2,577 390 
1987 2,588 380 
1988 2,582 380 
1989 2,610 380 
1990 2,679 410 
1991 2,714 440 
1992 2,729 470 
1993 .. 490 
1994 .. 530 
   
Source: Country Tables 1994, FAO, Rome: 1994, pp. 50-51. World Development Report 1992, 
1993, 1994 and 1995. 
 